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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKET AND
MONETARY POLICY
by
Anni Huang
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2017
Under the Supervision of Professor Kundan Kishor
My dissertation studies the behavior of international credit flow and the associated
monetary policy spillover effect. In the first chapter, I am interested in decomposing the
long-run variations and the short-run variations of US dollar denominated credit in
emerging market economies. This paper uses a multivariate correlated unobserved
component model to study the dynamic relationship among dollar credit in emerging
market economies, US interest rates and the dollar index. The results from this model
suggest that the transitory shocks to dollar credit in emerging market economies are
highly negatively correlated with the transitory shocks to the US interest rate and the
transitory shocks to the dollar index. The estimate of the cyclical component of dollar
credit well captures the recent boom and bust phase in emerging market.
The rise in non-financial corporate overseas debt issuance has been playing a
critical role in international capital flow activities. The second chapter of my
dissertation examines the determinants of corporate overseas bond issuance in 32
countries during 1993-2015. The results suggest that the compression in risk premium
has encouraged the corporates in emerging markets to borrow from international bond
markets. This effect is more prevalent in countries with tighter international capital
control policies, so that corporates outside financial regulation serve as surrogate
financial intermediaries at the border. These incentives suggest a potential systematic
shift in international financial risk transmission through corporate fixed-income markets
and a possible external shock channeled through the monetary policy spillover effect.
ii
The third chapter investigates further into the relative strengths of the global,
regional, and country-idiosyncratic factors in driving debt dollarization in global
financial market. Using a dynamic factor model, we decompose the fluctuations in the
dollar debt growth of 12 countries into a global factor, a developed economy factor, an
emerging market factor, and country-specific factors. We find that, since 2009, the
global factor of the dollar debt growth has been increasing dramatically. It is the global
factor that plays the dominant role in explaining the dollar debt growth of these
countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As the financial markets are becoming more integrated globally, we observe an in-
crease in various cross-border financial activities. The international credit market has
become an important component for borrowers and lenders around the world. While an
integrated credit market helps promote risk sharing at the global scope, the cyclical vari-
ations in credit lending, some of which are driven by global factors (e.g. US monetary
policy shocks), could potentially create domestic monetary and financial instability in
the short run. It becomes even more challenging to stabilize the domestic economy when
an external shock is playing a bigger role from the policy maker perspective. Moreover,
some capital control policies, without proper design, may distort the credit market and
push financial risk outside the traditional regulatory framework. For instance, a tighter
regulation on international banking activities after Great Recession may explain the bliz-
zard phenomenon that non-financial firms act as surrogate financial intermediaries to
participate in the international corporate bond market.
In my dissertation, I try to explain the variation in the international credit flow and
discuss the effect of the relevant public policies on the credit market. The first chapter of
my dissertation is to untangle the short-run and long-run variations in the dollar credit
in EMEs. Among the existing literature, there have been many works that try to under-
stand the relationship between international credit and domestic credit or the relationship
between international credit and major economy monetary policy. As discussed above,
without differentiating the long-run and short-run variations of international credit, it
is difficult to tease apart the opposite effects of variations in the data series and iden-
tify the clean linkage between the short-run variations and the business cycles of other
macroeconomic variables. Therefore in this chapter, I try to decompose the short-run and
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long-run variations using a correlated multivariate unobserved component model. The
results from this model suggest that the transitory shocks to dollar credit in emerging
market economies are highly negatively correlated with the transitory shocks to the US
interest rate and the transitory shocks to the dollar index. The estimate of the cyclical
component of the dollar credit in emerging market from our model captures the recent
boom and bust phase in this market and compares favorably to a univariate trend-cycle
decomposition benchmark.
The second chapter of my dissertation digs further into the international credit market
by understanding the rising overseas corporate bond issuance behavior. After 2009, non-
financial firms in EMEs suddenly increase overseas bond issuance dramatically. They
behave like financial intermediaries in the international bond market to facilitate the
cross-border lending activities. A few related questions should be asked: Why do non-
financial firms increase overseas bond issuance? What are the associated financial risks in
this behavior? In this chapter, I carefully examine these questions using a panel dataset
that consists 32 countries during 1993-2015. The results suggest that the compression in
risk premium, due to advanced economy stimulative monetary policy, has encouraged the
corporates in emerging markets to borrow from international bond markets. This effect
is more prevalent in countries where policy makers impose tighter international capital
control, so that corporates outside financial regulation serve as surrogate financial inter-
mediaries at the border. Besides, corporates hold short-term assets in domestic currency
as collateral for outstanding overseas debt, in expecting domestic currency appreciation, a
behavior often phased as price arbitrage or carry trade position. These incentives suggest
a potential systematic shift in international financial risk transmission through corpo-
rate fixed-income markets and a possible external shock channeled through the monetary
policy spillover effect.
The third chapter investigates the debt dollarization in global financial market. Using
a dynamic factor model, we decompose the fluctuations in the dollar debt growth of 12
countries into a global factor, a developed economy factor, an emerging market factor,
and country-specific factors. We find that, it is the global factor that plays the dominant
2
role in explaining the dollar debt growth of these countries. Furthermore, since 2009, the
global factor of the dollar debt growth has been increasing dramatically, suggesting that
the global liquidity transmission is closely related to the US monetary policy spillover
effect. Our results also show that the estimated level of global factor is negatively cor-
related with VIX implying lower uncertainty in financial market tends to be associated
with higher level of global debt dollarization.
3
Chapter 2
The Rise of Dollar Credit in Emerging
Market Economies and US Monetary Policy
2.1 Introduction
The surge of dollar credit in the emerging market economies (EMEs henceforth) has
drawn close attention from the international financial market participants and the pol-
icymakers due to its potential role in the monetary and financial stability of the global
economy. The data from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) shows that the out-
standing US dollar credit to non-bank borrowers in the EMEs has risen from 1.69 trillion
dollar in 2008Q4 to 3.25 trillion dollar in 2015Q4. The cyclical nature of EME dollar
credit1 could also amplify the overall credit condition in the domestic economy and in-
crease the vulnerability of these the EMEs in dealing with negative economic shocks. For
example, during the expansionary phase, the dollar credit floods into the EMEs, which
raises the challenge to stabilize the domestic monetary base. In the contractionary phase,
the dramatic outflow of dollar credit also creates difficulty to stabilize the exchange rate
and asset prices (Avdjiev et al., 2012). This was very evident during the ’taper tantrum’
of 2013. On the other hand, however, it has also been argued that the increasing role of
1EME dollar credit in this paper refers to the outstanding dollar credit to non-bank borrowers in
emerging market economies. It is composed of credit extended by all lenders: banks and non-bank
creditors, from foreign and domestic sources. Specifically, it is composed of loans extended by banks and
purchases of debt securities by both banks and by non-banks (as proxied by issues of debt securities).
Based on the guide to use BIS global liquidity indicators, emerging market economies refers to the
countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Malaysia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and
Singapore.
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dollar credit in the EMEs may signify a more integrated global financial market and a
greater degree of risk sharing across different countries.
The growing academic interest in the literature on examining the dollar credit in
the EMEs has also coincided with the recent emphasis on the role of US monetary pol-
icy in boosting global liquidity. Global liquidity refers to the global factor that drives
cross-border spillover in financial conditions and credit growth. Shin (2013) proposes
two phases of global liquidity after the Millennium. The first phase of global liquidity
transmission (2002-2008) is more associated in form of bank loans through global banking
system. The international bond market gradually took over the share of bank loans in
the second phase of global liquidity transmission starting in 2009. Since then, the large
scale of bond purchases as a result of of Quantitative Easing (QE) programs had led to
the portfolio re-balancing effect2 in the international bond market. A few papers and
policy studies have provided narrative evidence (Borio, et al. 2011; McCauley, et al.,
2015) in support of the hypothesis that the abundance of global liquidity was one of the
causes of the boom of the dollar credit in the EMEs.
Although much attention has been given to the rise of dollar credit and its apparent
relationship with US monetary policy and the valuation of the US dollar, not much work
has been done to systematically disentangle the short-run and the long-run relationships
among these variables. It is perfectly plausible to think that the short-run relationship
between dollar credit in emerging markets and the stance of monetary policy in the US
may be very different from its long-run relationship. The long-run dollar credit in the
emerging market may be driven more by its long-run absorptive capacity instead of the
short-run increase in liquidity or the weakness of the US dollar. Therefore, it is very
important to decompose the overall EME dollar credit and isolate the cyclical variations
from its long-term trend, by taking into account the information on US interest rate and
the dollar valuation. In addition to estimating the short-run and the long-run correlation
between the shocks to each series, this approach will also yield us a quantitative estimate
2The portfolio re-balancing effect in this context means when the Fed purchases bonds from the
investors, the investors need to purchase additional bonds from somewhere else, for instance, emerging
market economies, if they want to maintain the original weights on different asset classes.
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of how big the cyclical component in dollar credit was at different points in time during
the last few years.
To examine the long-run and short-run relationship among these variables, we propose
to use a correlated multivariate unobserved component (UC hereafter) model which is
a multivariate counterpart of the correlated univariate UC model as outlined in Morley,
Nelson and Zivot (2003).3 This model allows us to decompose the movements in dollar
credit, interest rate and dollar index4 into a slow-moving trend component and a cyclical
component simultaneously. The slow-moving trend captures the long-run evolution of
these variables and the cyclical component captures the short-run movements. This
model allows us to not only estimate the permanent and transitory movements, but
also provides us a measure of correlation of the long-run movements and the short-run
movements among dollar credit, interest rate and dollar index.5 For example, if the recent
narrative about the role of exceptionally low interest rate in boosting EME dollar credit is
correct, then we would observe a negative correlation between the shock to the transitory
component of dollar credit and the shock to transitory component of the US interest rate.
To take into account the zero lower bound problem associated with the federal funds rate
and the short-term interest rate in the recent time period, we use the shadow interest
rate as proposed by Wu and Xia (2016) as a proxy for US monetary policy stance. The
shadow interest rate takes into account the impact of unconventional monetary policy on
interest rate and unlike the federal funds rate, is allowed to fall below zero.
To understand the intuition behind the structure of our model, one could think of the
credit activities in the EMEs as a form of international investment. From the investors’
perspective, the return of lending dollar in the EMEs depends on the interest rate paid
from these credit instruments. The US interest rate, the risk-free rate in the international
credit market, is a major factor in pricing the interest rates on the international bank
3Multivariate correlated unobserved component model has also been applied in other context. See for
example, Sinclair (2009), Morley (2007), Bhatt and Kishor (2016) among others.
4Dollar index refers to the broad trade-weighted US dollar index. This variable is a proxy of the
dollar valuation against other currencies.
5It should be noted at the outset that we are interested in understanding the role of external forces in
dollar credit growth. Domestic factors like GDP growth may also affect the movements in dollar credit
growth in the EMEs. In our set up, the dynamic behavior of trend and cycle should be able to capture
some of these effects.
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loans and the corporate bond yields. From the EME borrowers’ perspective, the dollar
valuation in the currency market is also critical in determining their real external debt
burden, besides the US monetary policy rate. The expectation of domestic currency
appreciation will lower the expected external debt burden in the future and vice versa.
To summarize, we can think of this three-variable dynamic system as the application of
interest rate parity in international credit activities.
We find interesting and economically meaningful results from the estimated multi-
variate correlated unobserved component model. The maximum likelihood estimates of
our correlated multivariate UC model suggest that there is a strong negative correlation
between the transitory shock to dollar credit and the transitory shock to the US interest
rates. This suggests that a temporary decline in interest rate below its long-run level
is associated with an increase in dollar credit above its long-run level. We also find a
very high negative correlation between the transitory shocks to dollar credit and the
transitory shocks to the dollar index, implying an appreciation of US dollar is associated
with a decline in dollar credit in the EMEs in the short-run. These results support the
anecdotal and narrative evidence on the strong relationship between dollar credit and the
US interest rates and also between dollar credit and the strength of the US dollar. We
also find that the trend-cycle decomposition of EME dollar credit from our multivariate
correlated unobserved component model captures the recent boom and bust behavior and
compares favorably to a univariate trend-cycle decomposition benchmark. In particular,
our results suggest that the dollar credit before the taper tantrum was 10% above its
long-run trend in the emerging market economies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a literature
review about global liquidity transmission and discusses the associated monetary policy
spillover effect. The third section introduces the data used in this study and the setup
of the correlated multivariate UC model. The fourth section interprets and presents the
results from the model. The last section concludes the paper.
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2.2 Literature Review
The literature on dollar credit in the EMEs is nascent. Few papers have tried to
address this issue from different perspectives. In understanding the phenomenon that
dollar credit outside the US behaves differently from the US domestic dollar credit, Borio,
McCauley and McGuire (2011) take a look at the recent behavior of international credit
and associate it with the overall credit conditions. Their descriptive analysis reveals the
fact that US dollar credit in some countries has been outgrowing the overall credit during
the credit booms. A formal analysis later on from Avdjiev, McCauley and McGuire (2012)
regresses the cross-sectional change in credit-to-GDP ratio on the change in international
credit during the credit boom phase (2002-2008) and regresses the credit growth in the
EMEs on the change in international credit during the credit bust phase (2008-2011).
Their results suggest that international credit amplifies the overall credit cycles in the
EMEs. While in these studies, the authors often use the share of international credit in
the overall credit to measure the cyclical variation of international credit, it is worthwhile
to recognize that the trend of international credit and the trend of the overall credit
can be driven by different underlying factors, therefore they do not need to share the
common trend in the numerator and denominator. For instance, the long-term trend
of international credit could be explained by the integration of international financial
market, but the long-term trend of the overall credit condition may respond more to
the domestic economic fundamentals. Thus without isolating the long-term trend from
these two credit series, it is very difficult to perform a clean analysis about the cyclical
comovement between the international credit and the overall credit condition.
Since the recent global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the outstanding US dollar credit
to the non-bank borrowers in the EMEs has roughly doubled within the past seven years.
The commentators associate this surge to US monetary policy spillover, mainly because of
the ultra low interest rates in the US. He and McCauley (2013) survey a number of studies
on the transmission of monetary policy of the major advanced economies to East Asia and
conclude that policy rates, bond yields and exchange rates are three price channels in the
transmission process. McCauley, McGuire and Suchko (2015) also link the US monetary
8
policy, leverage and flow into bond funds to explain the dollar credit extended to non-US
borrowers. In this paper, since our goal is to understand the behavior of the overall
dollar credit condition, regardless of the credit instruments, we focus on the two price
channels—interest rate and currency appreciation/depreciation, an analytical framework
which can be interpreted as based upon international interest rate parity theory. 6
It should be pointed out that we focus on EME dollar credit, a subject we believe to be
ideal to study the monetary policy spillover effect in global liquidity transmission. This
is because, the composition of bank loan and bond issuance depends on country-specific
contexts, for instance, the regulatory emphasis of capital control. Tighter regulation on
international banking practice could push the domestic borrowers to issue bonds overseas
and vice versa (Caballero et al., 2015). Since our goal is to understand the trend and
cycle of the dollar credit in emerging market economies, we purposely ignore the credit
breakdown based on types of financial instruments. Furthermore, we choose to study
EME dollar credit, instead of Euro, Yen or other currency credit, is because different
currency credit could be sensitive to different monetary policy rates and dollar credit
dominates other currencies in the currency breakdown of international credit (Borio, et
al., 2011). The last but not the least, we work with the dollar credit in the EMEs, because
the dollar credit outside US may respond to factors in different ways when it comes to
the EMEs compared to other advanced economies. (Borio, et al. 2011; McCauley, et al.,
2015)
2.3 Data and Empirical Model
2.3.1 Data Description
Our sample period spans from the first quarter of 2000 to the last quarter of 2015. The
sample period is based on data availability. Measuring dollar credit can be a challenging
exercise. Fortunately, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) website provides global
6See the empirical model section for details.
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liquidity indicators to measure the ease of financing in global financial markets. 7 Among
various global credit aggregates, we use the US dollar credit to non-bank sector in the
EMEs in this study. This measure aggregates all the maturities of credit instruments.
The original data is measured in trillions of US dollar and we take the natural log of this
series and use the log-transformed series in the model estimation.
The second variable in our exercise is US interest rate that proxies the stance of US
monetary policy. The ideal candidate would have been the federal funds rate if there
was not a zero lower bound (ZLB) problem. The ZLB issue arises during and after the
Great Recession, as the Fed quickly lowered the federal funds rate close to zero and
also implemented the unconventional monetary policies, including large-scale purchases
of financial assets from private financial corporations. These unconventional monetary
policies helped inject more liquidity into the market than implied by the federal funds
rate, which basically had no room to be lowered further. The overall monetary policy
stance thus can not simply be captured by the variations in the federal funds rate itself.
To take this ZLB problem into account, Wu and Xia (2016) proposed to use the shadow
interest rate to provide a comprehensive measure to summarize the overall stance of
monetary policy while the federal funds rate stuck at the ZLB environment. The shadow
interest rate measure originated from the idea in Black (1995) to price the interest rate as
an option. Wu and Xia (2016) conducted an analytical approximation for the forward rate
in the Shadow Rate Term Structure Model (SRTSM), by linearizing the state-space model
representation of the three-factor SRTSM. Then they used the estimated parameters and
decomposed three unobserved factors to compute the shadow interest rate. The likelihood
ratio test could not reject the hypothesis that the parameters relating the shadow interest
rate to key macroeconomic variables under the ZLB environment are the same as those
that related the federal funds rate to those variables before the Great Recession. Because
of its intuitive appeal, Wu and Xia (2016) shadow interest rate measure has been gaining
widespread attention. 8
7The term global liquidity is used by the BIS to mean the ease of financing in global financial markets.
BIS publishes measures of global liquidity indicators. See https : //www.bis.org/statistics/gli.htm?m
for details.
8Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta posts Wu and Xia shadow federal funds rate on the website: https :
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Because of the above mentioned reasons, we use the shadow interest rate proposed
by Wu and Xia (2016) as a proxy for the Fed’s overall monetary policy stance. The
reason we choose to use this measure in our benchmark estimation over some alternative
measures, for instance, the longer-term interest rates which suffer less from the ZLB issue,
is because the term premium in the long-term interest rates could potentially contaminate
the monetary policy stance. Nevertheless, we still perform a robustness test with 1-year
treasury bill rate, given the fact that our dollar credit measure aggregates all the credit
instruments regardless of their term to maturity. The third variable in our exercise is the
US dollar exchange rate in the global currency market. We use the broad trade-weighted
US dollar index to measure the dollar valuation in the currency market. The larger the
index, the stronger the US dollar is, or equivalently, the more US dollar appreciates, and
vice versa.
2.3.1 Empirical Model
In this paper, we use a trivariate unobserved component model to model the dynam-
ics in EME dollar credit (Yt), interest rate (It) and dollar index (Dt). This model is
multivariate extension of the model proposed by Morley, Nelson and Zivot (2003). To
understand the intuition behind the structure of our model, one could think of the credit
activities in the EMEs as a form of international investment. From the investors’ per-
spective, the return of lending dollar in the EMEs depends on the interest rate paid from
these credit instruments. The US monetary policy rate, the risk-free rate in the interna-
tional credit market, is a major factor in pricing the interest rates on the international
bank loans and the corporate bond yields. From the EME borrowers’ perspective, the
dollar valuation in the currency market is also critical in determining their real external
debt burden, besides the US monetary policy rate. The expectation of domestic currency
appreciation will lower the expected external debt burden in the future and vice versa.
To summarize, we can think of this three-variable dynamic system as the application of
interest rate parity in international credit activities. Moreover, the interest rate parity
//www.frbatlanta.org/cqer/research/shadowrate.aspx?panel = 1
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has to hold in both the short-run and the long-run market equilibrium. Therefore, the
dynamics of interest rate and exchange rate will provide useful information in explaining
the dynamics of dollar credit in the EMEs.9 Our model takes the following form:
EME Dollar Credit:
Yt = τyt + cyt (1)
τyt = µy + τyt−1 + ηyt, ηyt ∼ iidN(0, σ2ηy) (2)
cyt = φ1ycyt−1 + φ2ycyt−2 + εyt, εyt ∼ iidN(0, σ2εy) (3)
Interest Rate:
It = τit + cit (4)
τit = µi + τit−1 + ηit, ηit ∼ iidN(0, σ2ηi) (5)
cit = φ1icit−1 + φ2icit−2 + εit, εit ∼ iidN(0, σ2εi) (6)
Dollar Index:
Dt = τdt + cdt (7)
τdt = µd + τdt−1 + ηdt, ηdt ∼ iidN(0, σ2ηd) (8)
cdt = φ1dcdt−1 + φ2dcdt−2 + εdt, εdt ∼ iidN(0, σ2εd) (9)
Each series is decomposed into a stochastic trend component (τjt, i = Y, IorD) and a
cyclical component (cjt, i = Y, IorD) implying an I(1) process for all the variables. The
non-stationarity of these variables are confirmed by the unit root tests where we do not
reject the null of unit root for all the variables.10 We also do not impose the common trend
restriction, i.e., all three variables have their own trend and cycle components and these
components are allowed to have a certain degree of correlation based on the economic
intuition we will discuss later. In fact, we do test for cointegration among these three
9 It can be argued that a more realistic model should also include more variables.This is a valid
criticism. However, the objective of this paper is to understand the dynamic relationship between US
monetary policy and dollar credit in the EMEs, therefore, in the interest of parsimony we focus on these
three variables.
10The detailed results are not reported here for brevity. They are available upon request.
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variables and do not find evidence to support this for the sample period under study.
Secondly, we specify the dynamics of trend and cycle components. The cyclical com-
ponent in each series is assumed to follow an AR (2) process. This assumption captures
the auto correlation structures as observed in the correlogram and provides rich dynam-
ics in the data series to enable us to identify all the parameters under the state-space
model framework (Morley, Nelson and Zivot, 2003). The trend components are assumed
to follow a random walk process with a drift, and as mentioned above, we do not impose
a common trend among these three variables.11
Thirdly, we assume the shocks to the trend and cycle components follow a white
noise process, but allow for non-zero cross-correlation across series. The shocks to the
trend components (ηjt, i = Y, I, orD) have a long-run effect on the trend because the
trend is assumed to follow a random walk process. The shocks to the cyclical component
(εjt, i = Y, IorD) have a short-run effect on the cycle because the cycle follows a stationary
autoregressive process with two lags. The shocks to each trend component are allowed to
be correlated across each other, so are the shocks to the cyclical components. However, we
impose the zero correlation between the shocks to the trend component and the shocks to
the cycle component within and between series. That is to say, we assume that the shocks
that generate a long-run effect are different from the shocks that generate a short-run
effect. This assumption for example, isolates the monetary policy shocks, which often are
considered neutral in the long term, from the productivity shocks, which has a persistent
effect in the real economy.
Below is the correlated multivariate unobserved component model setup based on the
previous discussion. It should be pointed out that, in the variance-covariance matrix of
the shocks to the trend and cycle, σηyηi, σηyηd, and σηiηd are the pairwise covariance of
the shocks to the trend of EME dollar credit, monetary policy rate and dollar index.
σεyεi, σεyεd, and σεiεd are the pairwise covariance of the shocks to the cycle of EME dollar
credit, monetary policy rate and dollar index. The estimates of correlation coefficients,
11We also explore the random walk model with drift to capture the potential shocks in the percentage
changes in additional to the shocks to the levels for stochastic trend. The results do not show evidence
in support of this model..
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instead of covariances, will be reported in Table 1. We estimate the model using the
classical maximum likelihood via the Kalman filter. 12
Measurement Equation:

Yt
It
Dt
 =

1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0


τyt
cyt
cyt−1
τit
cit
cit−1
τdt
cdt
cdt−1

Transition Equation:

τyt
cyt
cyt−1
τit
cit
cit−1
τdt
cdt
cdt−1

=

µy
0
0
µi
0
0
µd
0
0

+

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 φ1y φ2y 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 φ1i φ2i 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 φ1d φ2d
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0


τyt−1
cyt−1
cyt−2
τit−1
cit−1
cit−2
τdt−1
cdt−1
cdt−2

+

ηyt
εyt
0
ηit
εit
0
ηdt
εdt
0

12See Kim and Nelson (2000) for the details of the estimation procedure.
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Variance-Covariance Matrix of the Shocks to Trend and Cycle:
Q =

σ2ηy 0 0 σηyηi 0 0 σηyηd 0 0
0 σ2εy 0 0 σεyεi 0 0 σεyεd 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
σηyηi 0 0 σ
2
ηi 0 0 σηiηd 0 0
0 σεyεi 0 0 σ
2
εi 0 0 σεiεd 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
σηyηd 0 0 σηiηd 0 0 σ
2
ηd 0 0
0 σεyεd 0 0 σεiεd 0 0 σ
2
εd 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2.4 Results and Interpretation
We present the results of this model in the next three subsections. In the first sub-
section, we discuss the parameter estimates and also provide interpretation for the cor-
relation of the shocks to the trend and cycle among the three variables. In the second
subsection, we discuss the evolution of the estimated trend and cycle of each series and
examine whether the trend and cycle components capture the long-run trend and the
cyclical variation during the sample period. In the third subsection, we look at both the
long-term and short-term comovement among these three variables.
2.4.1 Dynamic Relationship among EME dollar Credit, US In-
terest Rate and the Dollar Index
Table 1 provides the maximum likelihood estimates of all the parameters. The cor-
responding standard errors are in the parentheses. The results suggest that the cyclical
shocks dominate the variation in the overall EME dollar credit. The standard deviation
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of the shocks in the trend of EME dollar credit is 0.01413, smaller compared to the stan-
dard deviation of the shocks in the cycle, 0.017. Additionally, for the shadow interest
rate, the standard deviation of the shocks in the trend is 0.274, almost twice as large as
the standard deviation of the shocks in the cycle. The results seem to suggest that vari-
ations in slow moving component in the shadow interest rate is dominant. However, the
variations in cyclical component are also significant. For the dollar index, the standard
deviation of shocks to the trend and cycle components are 0.015 and 0.016 respectively,
implying similar importance of transitory and permanent variation in dollar index. As
far as the estimated parameters of the cyclical components are concerned, we find that
the cyclical component of all the variables are persistent implying a shock to the cycle,
though transient, persists for a while.
The correlation analysis of the shocks to the cycles among these variables suggests
that the cyclical variation among EME dollar credit, monetary policy rate and dollar
credit are strongly correlated. The correlation coefficient between the transitory shock
to dollar credit and the transitory shock to US interest rate is -0.97. The correlation
coefficient between the transitory shock to EME dollar credit and the transitory shock
to dollar index is -0.94. And the correlation coefficient between the transitory shock to
US interest rate and the the transitory shock to dollar index is 0.99. The standard errors
of these estimated parameters confirm that these correlation coefficients are significantly
different from zero.
The strong negative correlation between the transitory shock to US interest rate and
the transitory shock to dollar credit in the EMEs suggests that, a temporary decrease in
US interest rate below its long-run trend leads to a temporary increase in EME dollar
credit as it lowers the cost of borrowing. In addition to the lower cost, the transitory
decline in interest rate may also reflect temporary abundance of liquidity as witnessed
during the QE programs. The negative correlation between transitory shock to dollar
index and transitory shock to dollar credit in the EMEs is also very intuitive. An increase
13The unit of measurement here is log trillion of US dollars for the EME dollar credit series. The unit
of measurement for US shadow interest rate is percentage point and the unit of measurement for dollar
index is the log transformation of the original index.
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in dollar index implies an appreciation of dollar index above its long-run trend and these
movements make the dollar financing activities in the EMEs less appealing temporarily.
We can motivate the strong positive correlation between the transitory shock to US
interest rate and the transitory shock to US dollar index by considering an open economy’s
short-run equilibrium model. At the initial output level and given the sticky price level in
the short-run, an increase in US money supply pushes down the US interest rate. Since
the US monetary change is temporary and does not affect the expected future exchange
rate, so to preserve interest rate parity, the exchange rate must depreciate immediately
to create the expectation that the US dollar will appreciate in the future. Therefore, in
the short run, a negative transitory shock to US monetary policy rate is predicted to
associate with a negative transitory shock to US dollar index, which is exactly what we
identify in our model estimation.
The correlation analysis of the shocks to the trends among these variables confirm our
earlier finding that these three variables do not share a common trend and hence, are not
cointegrated.14The correlation coefficient between the permanent shocks to EME dollar
credit and the permanent shocks to US interest rate is 0.67. The correlation coefficient
between the permanent shock to US interest rate and the permanent shocks to dollar
index is -0.68. The standard errors of these estimated parameters confirm that these
correlation coefficients are significantly different from zero. The correlation coefficient
between the permanent shock to EME dollar credit and the permanent shock to dollar
index is insignificant and low. Therefore, it is not likely that these variables share the
common trend, which supports the conjecture that we need to decompose the trend and
cycle components from the series to understand the business cycles of these variables.
The negative correlation between the permanent shock to US interest rate and the
permanent shock to dollar index seems puzzling at the first glance. However, it can
be explained using the forward looking behavior of these variables. If an unexpected
permanent increase in interest rate provide the signal that inflation is expected to go up
in future, then nominal exchange rate may respond instantaneously in response to this
14In extreme case of cointegration, we will observe perfect correlation in the trend shock of these
variables.
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Table 1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: A Correlated Multivariate UC Model
Description Parameter
Estimate
(Standard Error)
Log likelihood value llv 295.8723
EME dollar credit
S.D. of permanent shocks to the EME dollar credit σηy
0.0139
(0.0041)
S.D. of temporary shocks to the EME dollar credit σεy
0.0168
(0.0033)
the EME dollar credit drift µy
0.0274
(0.0025)
EME dollar credit 1st AR parameter φ1y
1.3851
(0.1399)
EME dollar credit 2nd AR parameter φ2y
-0.4770
(0.1251)
shadow interest rate
S.D. of permanent shocks to shadow interest rate σηi
0.2738
(0.0312)
S.D. of temporary shocks to shadow interest rate σεi
0.1549
(0.0327)
Shadow interest rate drift µi
-0.0792
(0.0481)
Shadow interest rate 1st AR parameter φ1i
1.9072
(0.0355)
Shadow interest rate 2nd AR parameter φ2i
-0.9462
(0.0363)
US dollar index
S.D. of permanent shocks to US dollar index σηd
0.0148
(0.0029)
S.D. of temporary shocks to US dollar index σεd
0.0158
(0.0027)
US dollar index drift µd
-0.0026
(0.0021)
US dollar index 1st AR parameter φ1d
1.3585
(0.1144)
US dollar index 2nd AR parameter φ2d
-0.5726
(0.0980)
Cross-series correlations
Correlation: Permanent dollar credit/
Permanent interest rate
ρηyηi
0.6669
(0.2118)
Correlation: Permanent dollar credit/
Permanent dollar index
ρηyηd
0.0842
(0.3396)
Correlation: Permanent interest rate/
Permanent dollar index
ρηiηd
-0.6864
(0.2532)
Correlation: Transitory dollar credit/
Transitory interest rate
ρεyεi
-0.9719
(0.1157)
Correlation: Transitory dollar credit/
Transitory dollar index
ρεyεd
-0.9406
(0.2205)
Correlation: Transitory interest rate/
Transitory dollar index
ρεiεd
0.9941
(0.0372)
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Figure 1: Trends from Correlated Multivariate Unobserved Component Model
The figures below report the trend components of EME dollar credit, shadow interest rate and
dollar index. The dollar credit in the EMEs is measured in log trillions of USD and multiplied
by 100. The shadow interest rate is measured in percentage points. The log of US dollar index
has been multiplied by 100.
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news about higher than expected inflation. Similarly, the forward-looking behavior can
explain the positive correlation between permanent shock to interest rate and permanent
shock to dollar credit. An unexpected permanent increase in interest rate may provide
information about higher than expected inflation, which in turn may lead to a depreciation
of the dollar as argued before. This will be associated with an unexpected permanent
increase in dollar credit in emerging market economies. Overall, the results from the
correlation analysis clearly suggests value in examining the short-run and the long-run
relationships separately. The results suggest that fundamentals seem to matter more in
the long-run, whereas the short-run boom may be associated with temporary phases of
monetary policy as well as movements in dollar index.
2.4.2 Trend-Cycle Decomposition
In this subsection, we decompose the trend and cycle of EME dollar credit, interest
rate and dollar index using the correlated multivariate unobserved component model.
The stochastic trend in the multivariate UC model captures the long-run evolution in
EME dollar credit and also reflects the effect of recent global financial crisis (Figure 2).
In the long-run, there is an increasing trend in EME dollar credit, due to the global
financial integration. There was a downward shift in the trend during the financial crisis.
The effect of this negative shock on the trend of EME dollar credit persisted for few years.
The cyclical component from our multivariate UC model captures the evolution of
the dollar credit and its dynamic relationship with US interest rate and the dollar index
really well (Figure 2). During the initial part of our sample, the dollar credit cycle was
negative implying lower than potential credit in these countries. After the collapse of Bear
Stearns, emerging market economies provided a sanctuary for the international capital,
mainly because the investor community assumed that the EMEs are decoupled from
the developed markets.In the third quarter of 2008, Lehman Brother filed bankruptcy
that led to financial panic. These events were associated with a global contraction in
credit lending, which brought the dollar credit back down to its long-term trend. During
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Figure 2: Trend/Cycle Decomposition from Correlated Multivariate UC Model
This figure reports the trend component and the cyclical component of EME dollar credit.
The dollar credit in the EMEs is measured in log trillions of USD and multiplied by 100. The
UC trend is the trend component of EME dollar credit decomposed using the correlated
multivariate unobserved component (UC) model. The HP trend is the trend component of
EME dollar credit decomposed using Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter.
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this time period, the Federal Reserve lowered the policy rate significantly and dumped
liquidity into the financial market through several runs of the QE programs. The portfolio
re-balancing effect quickly directed the investors to the credit market in the EMEs to
chase for yield. Shin (2013) denotes the year 2009 as the beginning of the second phase
of global liquidity, because of the rapid capital flow into the EMEs in the form of non-
financial firm bond issuance. Our cyclical component from the multivariate UC model
indicates the expansionary cycle of EME dollar credit during 2009-2014, a phenomenon
widely observed and agreed upon among the financial market observers and researchers.
Starting from 2015, the persistent recovery of US economy and the slowdown in the
EMEs overturned the dollar credit flow and created the concern about the instability
of the EME financial markets and the feedback loops between the EMEs and advanced
economies.
2.4.3 Co-movement among the Cyclical Components
The estimated cyclical components from our model are displayed in Figure 3. Both
the qualitative and quantitative measures of the cycles are consistent with intuition and
they follow the dynamics of dollar credit, interest rates and dollar index very well. We
observe that cyclical variation in dollar index is strongly negatively associated with the
cyclical variation of EME dollar credit. Before 2008 financial crisis, when dollar was
relatively strong, the overall EME dollar credit was increasing but was still below its trend,
consistent with the idea that stronger dollar works against capital inflow in the EMEs.
The correlation between the cyclical components of EME dollar credit and the dollar index
suggests that the weak dollar could potentially contribute to the surge in the credit flow
into the EMEs. When the financial crisis hit the US economy, the dollar depreciated and
the investors with dollar assets were looking for higher yields in alternative asset classes.
During this recessionary phase in the US, EME dollar credit witnessed an expansionary
period during the 2009-2014 sample period. The negative correlation between cyclical
components of EME dollar credit and the dollar index also suggests that the strong dollar
could potentially slow down the credit flow into the EMEs. Since 2015, the recovery of the
22
Figure 3: Cycles in the Correlated Multivariate Unobserved Component Model
This figure reports the cyclical components of the three variables EME dollar credit, shadow
interest rate and the dollar index. The dollar credit in the EMEs is measured in log trillions of
USD and multiplied by 100. The shadow interest rate is measured in percentage points. The
US dollar index is in logs and has been multiplied by 100.
US economy has played a role in strengthening of the US dollar and as a result financial
markets started anticipating a hike in the interest rates. EME dollar credit seemed to
have entered a contractionary phase during this time period. Note that the overall EME
dollar credit could still increase due to the underlying increasing trend. The dollar index
is also relevant for the market participants to estimate the overall return when US policy
rate hits the zero-lower bound. The risk of international carry trade, a typical cyclical
investment behavior, mainly comes from the exchange rate risk under this environment.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the dollar index can provide useful information in
understanding the EME dollar credit conditions.
The plot of the cyclical component of interest rate suggests that interest rates were
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slightly above its long-run trend prior to the great recession. In the earlier part of
the sample, the results suggest that the interest rate were below its trend suggesting
an accommodative stance of monetary policy. This is consistent with the arguments
proposed in the literature that has argued that the interest rates were too low in the pre-
financial crisis period (Taylor, 2007). The unconventional monetary policy tools utilized
by the Federal Reserve during the great recession led to a decline in the interest rate
below its long-run average in our model during and after the great recession. This period
was also associated with surge in dollar credit above its long-run trend as shown in Figure
3. The plot also shows that interest rate started moving towards its long-run trend at the
beginning of 2015 and this is also associated with the decline in the cyclical component
of dollar credit.
2.5 Robustness Check
In this section, we check the robustness of our results by substituting Wu and Xia
(2016) shadow interest rate with other proxies for the stance of monetary policy. We
also compare the estimated trend-cycle from our approach with univariate trend-cycle
decomposition using different methods.
2.5.1 An Alternative Interest Rate Measure
As explained earlier, there are several possible proxies that can capture the stance
of monetary policy. We use shadow interest rate because it does not suffer from ZLB
problem, and is also not contaminated by term premium . The shorter term interest
rates, for instance, federal funds rate or three-month treasury bill rate, suffer seriously
from the ZLB issue during post-2008 sample period. While the longer term interest rates
raise less concern from this problem, they are more easy to be contaminated by the
variation in the term premium. Since our EME dollar credit measure aggregates all the
credit instruments, regardless of the term to maturity, by taking the middle ground, we
use one-year Treasury bill rate in the model to check the robustness of our result. The
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results from this exercise is shown in Figure 4. The plot clearly shows the robustness of
our estimation to the use of 1-year interest rate as a measure of monetary policy stance,
as the estimated cycle closely resembles the one with the shadow rate as a measure of
monetary policy stance.
Figure 4: The Cyclical Component from Correlated Multivariate UC Model
This figure reports the cyclical component of EME dollar credit. The dollar credit in the
EMEs is measured in log trillions of USD and multiplied by 100. The UC cycle (Shadow
Rate) is the cyclical component of EME dollar credit decomposed using the shadow interest
rate as the measure of US monetary policy stance in the correlated multivariate unobserved
component (UC) model. The UC cycle (1-year T-bill Rate) is the cyclical component of EME
dollar credit decomposed using the one-year treasury bill rate as the measure of US monetary
policy stance in the same UC model setup.
2.5.2 Comparison with Univariate Trend-Cycle Decomposition
In addition to the estimation of the correlation between shocks to the permanent and
transitory component, the use of multivariate model in theory should also provide us a
superior measure of trend and cycle as compared to the univariate model. To examine
this hypothesis, we also perform trend-cycle decomposition using the univariate models
(Figure 5). The univariate models include a linear trend model, a HP filter model and a
25
univariate UC model. The linear trend model decomposes the EME dollar credit series
into a linear-trend component and a cycle component. The HP filter method uses an
algorithm to smooth the original data series to estimate the trend component and the
difference between them is the cyclical component. The parameter value λ is set at 1600
as suggested by Hodrick and Prescott for the quarterly data. The univariate UC model
only uses the series of EME dollar credit to decompose a stochastic trend component and
a cyclical component with the same specification as in the multivariate UC model.
Figure 5: Comparing EME Dollar Credit Cycles
This figure reports cyclical components of EME dollar credit based on alternate decompositions.
The results presented above clearly demonstrates that the estimate of trend and cycles
obtained from the the multivariate UC model is better able to capture the dynamics of
these three variables. The linear trend model, assuming a constant slope in the trend
component, is not appropriate since it assumes no shock to the trend. The recent crisis is
considered as the most severe financial crisis after the Great Depression (1929-1933) and
we observe a clearly big negative shock to EME dollar credit series which the linear trend
model is unable to capture. Other univariate models, without assuming a linear trend,
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fail to generate realistic trend and cycle series by ignoring the relationship between EME
dollar credit and its price channels. The HP cycle seems to mimic the counterpart from
multivariate UC model very well before the crisis but diverge afterwards. The cycle from
the univariate UC model, instead, is close to the multivariate counterpart after the crisis.
Taking into account all the historical events as mentioned in the cycle interpretation,
the outflow of dollar credit slowed down before the crisis, due to the domestic boom,
but the magnitude of the negative cycle did not seem to be as large as suggested by the
univariate UC model. The HP cycle fails to capture the credit boom since 2009, while it
performed reasonably well before the crisis. Overall, it is clear from the analysis presented
above that there is valuable pay-off in utilizing information from other variables that are
useful in explaining EME dollar credit if one is interested in extracting its permanent
and transitory component.
2.6 The Effects of US Monetary Policy Shocks
With global financial integration and dollar as international currency, US monetary
policy plays a critical role in global liquidity transmission. Both the Fed and the EME
authorities are concerned about the dynamic impact of US monetary policy changes
on the international financial system. It would be an interesting exercise, therefore, to
examine the dynamic impact of monetary policy shock on dollar credit in the EMEs using
our multivariate unobserved component model.
Figure 6 plots the impulse responses of EME dollar credit and US dollar index when
there is a transitory Fed interest rate hike. Based on our model, the cyclical variation of
the three variables are correlated through the contemporary shocks in the error terms.
Given a positive transitory shock to US monetary policy, we would expect a negative
contemporaneous transitory shock to EME dollar credit and a positive contemporaneous
transitory shock to dollar index. The effects of the transitory shock would not disappear
immediately after the current period because of the persistent nature of the cyclical
components as it depends on the lagged values. From our impulse response analysis,
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Figure 6: Impact of a Transitory Increase in Interest Rate
This figure reports the impulse response functions of EME dollar credit and the dollar index
to to a temporary increase in US interest rates
we find a hump shaped response of US dollar index and a U-shaped response of dollar
credit to a contractionary monetary policy shock. The transitory nature of the shock
suggests that these effects slowly disappear over time. The results suggest that the US
dollar index and EME dollar credit do not move to the new equilibrium immediately
after the transitory shock to US monetary policy. From policy maker perspective, the US
interest rate hike above it long-run trend would strengthen US dollar and induce dollar
credit outflow for several months. Although the effect eventually disappears, however,
the transition process may come with international financial instability. On one hand,
the process creates the challenges in the balance of payment for the EME authorities.
They need to equip with enough official reserves to manage the rapid outflow of capital
and stabilize the foreign exchange rate. On the other hand, the appreciation of US dollar
and the outflow of dollar credit leave the EME borrowers pressured to pay back the
dollar-denominated debt.
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In order to be prepared for the transmission of international financial risk, in this case
through the rise in US interest rate above its trend, policy makers should adopt both
macro- and micro-prudential policies to deal with the monetary policy spillover effect.
Traditional macro-prudential policies focus on the soundness of financial corporations,
however, after 2009, non-financial firms engage heavily in the carry trade activities and
serve as surrogate financial intermediaries. The associated financial risks create new
challenges to the existing regulatory framework. For example, Hoffman (2014) provides
evidence that the very low world funding interest rates are associated with a rise in volatile
capital flows and asset market bubbles in fast-growing emerging markets. Furthermore,
although the integration of financial markets promote risk sharing in the long run, in
the short run, the external liquidity shocks and the interconnectivity of financial markets
make the international financial risk transmission easier and faster. In other words, the
global financial system may become more fragile in the short run, due to the externalities
in the market.15 Internalizing the costs and benefits require macro-prudential policy and
international coordination.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we use a correlated multivariate unobserved component model to exam-
ine the hypothesis about the role of ultra low US interest rates in the dollar credit boom
in the emerging market economies. In doing so, we also decompose the movements in
dollar credit in emerging markets, US interest rate and the dollar index into a permanent
and transitory component. The correlations among the cyclical components support the
idea that the rise of dollar credit in the EMEs is associated with US interest rate and
the US dollar index below its long-run trend. The estimated permanent and transitory
component from our model captures the dynamic features of EME dollar credit series and
performs better than univariate benchmarks in capturing the boom and the boost during
the last few years. The strong cyclical correlations among dollar credit in the EMEs, US
15Leijonhufvud (2007) suggests that the structural features inherent in today’s financial markets that
directly contribute to the instability in EM capital flows.
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interest rate and the dollar index suggest that the policymakers may need to take into ac-
count the US monetary policy spillover effect on domestic credit conditions of the EMEs,
by observing the stance of the US monetary policy and the behavior of the US dollar in
the foreign exchange market. Macro-prudential policies and international coordination
may be justified and needed, along with micro-prudential policies, as a consequence of
global liquidity transmission and the implied international financial instability.
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Chapter 3
Corporate Overseas Debt Issuance in the
Context of Global Liquidity Transmission
3.1 Introduction
The recent surge in non-financial corporate16 (hereafter ”corporate” ) overseas debt is-
suance after 2007-2009 financial crisis has started drawing attention from macroeconomic
researchers, as it plays a critical role in the conduct of international capital flow activities
in the emerging markets. This surge in the overseas debt issuance is also referred to as the
second phase of global liquidity (Shin, 2013).The first phase (2003-2007) of global liquidity
is associated with a rapid increase in cross-border international bank loans. The inter-
national banks lose the market share to international bond markets in the cross-border
activities substantially after the global financial crisis, partly because of the strengthened
financial system regulation. This fall in cross-border lending by international banks was
followed by a rise in the overseas debt issuance of the non-financial corporate sector. The
relative importance of corporate overseas debt issuance can be gauged from the fact that
more than half of the net ”external” financing of emerging economies in 2012 took place
through the issuance of international debt securities (Turner, 2014).
Given its importance for the stability of the global financial system, it is important
to understand the behavior and determinants of corporate overseas debt issuance. The
16In this paper, we are interested in non-financial corporate overseas debt issuance behavior. In finance
literature, non-financial corporates normally are referred as corporates. Financial corporates are required
to be specified explicitly to indicate the difference between these two types of subjects. We follow the
norm to use corporates to refer non-financial corporates hereafter in this paper.
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purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature. In particular, we want to examine
three hypotheses related to the overseas debt issuance of these corporate firms. First, is
there an evidence of price arbitrage on the part of these firms? Traditionally, a textbook-
version corporate only issues bonds overseas because of foreign currency exposures. Think
about the case when an exporting firm expects to receive a payment in foreign currency.
This firm should issue foreign currency liability to match the foreign currency asset,
in order to hedge foreign currency exposure. This behavior is considered as a typical
corporate risk management practice to help this company focus on the main operating
activities. In other words, they are not supposed to be interested in doing price arbitrage
in foreign exchange markets. Nevertheless, in recent years, many studies suggest that
corporate firms, especially large firms in emerging markets, may behave like financial
intermediaries in overseas debt issuance activities. [Black and Munro (2010), Bruno and
Shin (2015), Caballero et al (2015), Shin and Zhao (2013)]. Secondly, we also examine
whether the firms get around capital control measures enacted by the countries and act
more like a financial intermediary. This hypothesis is motivated by the recent behavior
of the firms in the emerging markets where we observe a surge in debt issuance even in
the presence of capital controls. Thirdly, we also examine the recent debate about the
transmission of the U.S monetary policy to the global financial system by examining the
link between overseas debt issuance and risk premium. To examine these hypotheses,
we utilize a recently developed database on international debt securities by the Bank of
International Settlement and perform a panel study of 32 countries for the 1993-2015
sample period.
Overall our results are consistent with the idea that non-financial firms in emerging
economies have been acting like financial intermediaries. Firstly, we find evidence in
support of price arbitrage hypothesis in case of emerging economies where we find sig-
nificant negative impact of level and volatility of exchange rate on changes in overseas
debt issuance. This implies that the corporate firms issue debt overseas in expecting that
domestic currency will appreciate against the US dollar. We also find that capital control
on bond market are positively correlated with corporate overseas debt issuance in emerg-
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ing economies whereas this relationship has opposite pattern in the advanced economies.
This difference in response to capital control across border reflects that corporate firms
in emerging markets have strong incentive to walk around capital control to tap into in-
ternational bond market, whereas corporate firms in advanced economies typically follow
the regulation to reduce cross-border financial activities. We also find strong evidence
between a measure of risk premium in the U.S. and overseas debt issuance in emerging
economies implying that overall credit conditions in the U.S. do play a significant role.
For advanced economies, however, we don’t find a significant relationship between risk
premium and debt issuance by its corporate firms implying that the non-financial firms in
the advanced economies do behave very differently than the firms in the emerging market
economies.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
on international debt securities. Section 3 presents our conceptual framework and econo-
metric methodology followed by a discussion. In section 4 and 5 we interpret and check
the robustness of the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
3.2 Literature Review
The surge in corporate overseas debt issuance plays an important role in the sec-
ond phase of global liquidity. Turner (2014) suggests that declining in term premium in
10-year US treasuries may have implication on greater sensitivity to global long-term in-
terest rates in emerging economy bond markets. McCauley et al (2014) also suggests that
term premium compression in US treasuries has significantly stimulate offshore dollar-
denominated bond issuance. Shin (2013) points out, furthermore, the transmission of
financial condition across borders has taken the form of ’reaching for yield’. The com-
positional shift in asset managers’ portfolios increases the demand for emerging market
corporate bonds, which leads to the decline of risk premium for these debt securities.
Meanwhile, the issuances of international debt securities explode in response to the com-
pression in risk premium and the declining capital cost in overseas bond market. Chung
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et al (2014) identify a positive relationship between domestic money growth and capital
flow to the non-bank sector in emerging markets. Large corporates borrow money over-
seas and hold short-term instruments in home country, such as deposits and other liquid
assets. This behavior essentially enables small corporates to borrow money overseas and
weakens the independence of monetary policy aiming at domestic liquidity control.
These papers describe the paths in monetary policy spillover and the role of corporates in
global liquidity transmission in the context of strict regulation imposed on international
banking system. We borrow Figure 1 from Shin and Zhao (2013) to visualize the role
of corporate debt issuance in global liquidity transmission. In the first phase of global
liquidity, domestic household depositors and international investors (mostly international
banks) supply liquidity to domestic financial system to finance the final corporate bor-
rower production projects. However, in the second phase of global liquidity, domestic
large corporates, rise to serve as surrogate intermediaries to facilitate liquidity transmis-
sion into domestic financial system, presumably due to the restriction on direct lending
from international banks. The large corporates headquartered in emerging markets may
use their overseas subsidiaries to issue bonds in international financial markets and receive
the proceeds through intra-company transactions (The subsidiaries can pay for operation
costs for the headquarters, for instance). In this way, the proceeds flowing into emerg-
ing markets are treated as a form of foreign direct investment and do not appear in the
residency-based external debt positions. This conjecture worries policy makers about the
effectiveness of capital control policies at the border and the creation of systematic risks
outside traditional international financial regulation framework.
Under this backdrop, researchers investigate the determinants of corporate debt is-
suance behavior by exploiting micro evidence from firm-level overseas debt issuance and
financial accounting information. Black and Munro (2010) examines the onshore/offshore
bond issuance decision by non-government residents of five Asia-Pacific countries. Price
arbitrage is identified as the most important motivator to issue offshore, for both finan-
cial and non-financial corporates. Market completeness and liquidity are also estimated
to drive issuance decisions, i.e. firms seeks for more complete financial markets to issue
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Figure 7: Transmission of Global Liquidity across Borders
Shin and Zhao (2013)
larger-size, longer-maturity bond at a lower capital cost. Nevertheless, this study uses
residency-based international bond issuance data, which may not be able to capture the
real volume of cross-border issuance, especially given the fact that non-financial firms
use intra-company transactions to avoid capital regulation across border. As depicted
by Bruno and Shin (2015), the difference widen significantly between nationality-based
and residency-based amount of external debt outstanding: the nationality-based external
debt position reaches roughly twice as much as the residency-based measures in 2014.
(Figure 2) Shin and Zhao (2013) use firm-level financial accounting information based on
consolidated balance sheet and debt issuance data to further investigate the role of cor-
porates as surrogate financial intermediaries. Their results also suggest that corporates
in emerging markets behave like financial intermediaries in the sense that the correlation
between financial assets and financial liabilities has a positive sign, which is supposed to
be an accounting feature for financial corporates instead of non-financial corporates. 17
17This argument is based on Pecking Order Theory (Myers, 1984) in corporate finance literature. See
Shin and Zhao (2013) for details.
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Figure 8: Corporate Overseas Debt Issuance in Emerging Markets
Bruno and Shin (2015)
Two recent micro studies, instead, focus on testing carry trade hypothesis. Both pa-
pers support the positive correlation between corporate overseas debt issuance and firm
cash holding, which essentially indicates a carry trade position. Bruno and Shin (2015),
furthermore, point out this phenomenon is more prevalent for emerging market firms dur-
ing favorable carry trade periods. Caballero et al (2015) suggests that there is evidence
for carry trade activities in countries with higher levels of capital controls. In our paper,
we also find that corporate overseas debt issuance behaviors are positively correlated
with capital controls at the border, especially in emerging markets where overall capital
control levels are much higher than in advanced economies.
To summarize, the literature provides some evidence to support the idea that corporates
dramatically increase overseas debt issuance to conduct price arbitrage and serve as surro-
gate financial intermediaries to facilitate capital flow across borders in emerging markets
or countries with strict capital controls. Put it differently, corporates may step into the
vacuum whereas financial sectors are blocked by international capital control regulation.
This paper, from our knowledge, is the first paper using macro nationality-based cor-
porate overseas debt issuance data, to tackle several hypotheses in the literature and to
explain the determinants of corporate overseas debt issuance behavior.
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3.3 Empirical Models
3.3.1 Price Arbitrage VS. Risk Management
To test the hypotheses mentioned above, we build three empirical models to study the
determinants of corporate overseas debt issuance behavior. In first model, we try to test
price arbitrage hypothesis against risk management hypothesis based on the contradictive
implication in response to exchange rate variables from these two hypotheses. If corpo-
rates behave more like price arbitragers, they will issue less debt when domestic currency
depreciates/ when the exchange rate is volatile. Whereas, if corporates behave like what
textbook suggests, they will issue more debt when domestic currency depreciates because
when domestic currency depreciates, export increases so as the foreign currency exposure.
In order to hedge the foreign currency exposure, they should issue more debt securities.
In addition, when exchange rate is more volatile, corporates are expected to have stronger
incentive to hedge larger portion of foreign currency asset exposure. In our model, the
exchange rate is computed based on direct quote against US dollar, which means the
exchange rate number is interpreted as the amount of domestic currency one US dollar
can purchase. Therefore, an increase in the exchange rate number implies depreciation
of domestic currency.
To be explicit, if price arbitrage hypothesis dominates risk management hypothesis,
then we would expect that β1 > 0 and β2 > 0; if the other way around, then β1 < 0 and
β2 < 0. Besides exchange rate and exchange rate volatility, we also control for relevant
economic fundamentals. In this case, we control for both domestic real GDP growth
rate and current account balance. In the most complete specification, we also control for
government foreign exchange market intervention, by adding the growth rate of official
reserve. This specification allows us to see the impact of exchange rate and exchange
rate volatility on corporate overseas net debt issuance while government intervention is
in place.
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Net Debt Issuanceit = β0 + β1Exchange V olatilityit−1 + β2Exchange Rateit−1
+ β3Real GDP Growthit−1 + β4CA Balanceit−1
+ β5Foreign Reserve Growthit−1 + γt + δi + εit
(10)
3.3.2 The Effectiveness of Capital Control Policies
In the second model, we are interested to study the effect of capital control on cor-
porate overseas debt issuance. The capital control policies imposed by governments are
designed to control for the amount of international capital flow across borders. There-
fore, if the capital control policies were effective and well-designed, we would expect the
reduction of all types of international capital flow, implying the reduction of corporate
debt issuance. If, instead, we found the effect of capital control was the rise in corporate
debt issuance, then the effectiveness of capital control policies could be in doubt. Explic-
itly speaking, the capital control policies may impose a binding constraint on financial
sectors, whereas the corporates may gain comparative advantage to take the role as fi-
nancial intermediaries. As explained previously, corporates are able to use intra-company
transactions to avoid the international capital control regulation.
Thereupon, the positive sign of capital control coefficient suggests the lack of effectiveness
of capital control on corporates, whereas the negative sign indicates the effectiveness of
capital control on both financial and non-financial sectors. As you may have noticed, we
do not control both exchange rate variables and capital control variables simultaneously
in one specification. This is due to the fact that capital control policies and exchange
rate stability are strongly dependent on each other. According to international monetary
policy trilemma, if the government imposes capital control at the border, then the coun-
try will gain the ability to stabilize the exchange rate and the independence of domestic
monetary policy. If, instead, the government is willing to let exchange rate float according
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to market forces, then the capital are free to flow across borders and monetary authorities
still maintain the independence of domestic monetary policies. Hence, the bottom line is,
we are not able to identify the clean effect of capital control and exchange rate variables
separately, by putting both of them into one specification.
Net Debt Issuanceit = β0 + β1Capital Controlit−1 + β2Real GDP Growthit−1
+ β3CA Balanceit−1 + γt + δi + εit
(11)
3.3.3 Advanced Economy Monetary Policy Spillovers: An Indi-
rect Test based on Corporate Risk Premium
As explained in the introduction, there may exist advanced economy monetary policy
transmission effect. In this study, we perform an indirect test based on the effect of
corporate risk premium. If β1 is negative, which suggests a decrease in risk premium will
increase corporate debt issuance, provides a piece of supportive evidence in the process
of monetary policy spillovers. We test this hypothesis by adding back all the variables in
the previous regressions and are able to show that risk premium indeed causes the rise
in corporate overseas debt issuance.
Net Debt Issuanceit = β0 + β1Risk Premiumit−1 + β2Real GDP Growthit−1
+ β3CA Balanceit−1 + β4Exchange V olatilityit−1 + β5Exchange Rateit−1
+ β6Capital Controlit−1 + γt + δi + εit
(12)
We control for both country fixed effect and year fixed effect in panel regressions in all
the model estimations. The standard errors we report in our paper are Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) propose a nonparamet-
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ric covariance matrix estimator that produces heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-
consistent standard errors that are robust to general forms of spatial and temporal de-
pendence. Because the nonparametric technique of estimating standard errors place no
restrictions on the limiting behavior of the number of panels, the size of cross-sectional
dimension in finite sample does not constitute a constraint on feasibility. These features
make Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard error the most suitable candidate in our mod-
els. Our sample includes 32 countries and quarterly data observations spanning across
1993-2015. Clearly, we have limited cross-sectional dimensions but relatively large time
series dimensions. Since our conjectures are mostly based on the stylized fact in emerging
markets, we split the sample countries into emerging market subsample (20 countries)
and advanced economy subsample (12 countries).
3.4 Data Description
Our sample includes 32 countries18 during the period 1993Q3-2015Q1. The key vari-
able we are interested in, net debt issuance based on nationality of corporate issuers, is
from Bank of International Settlement (BIS) website. Luckily, we are also able to find a
dataset, just available recently, about capital control measures in various financial mar-
kets, constructed based on IMF annual reports. This dataset allows us to disentangle the
effect of the capital control policies in each financial sector on corporate overseas debt
issuance separately. Table 2 lists all the data sources we use in this study.
Table 2: Data Sources
Variable Data Source
Net Debt Issuance (Millions of USD) Bank for International Settlements (BIS): http://www.bis.org
Exchange Rate (Quarterly Average) OANDA: http://www.oanda.com
Exchange Rate Volatility OANDA: http://www.oanda.com
GDP Growth Rate (%) FRED: https://fredqa.stlouisfed.org; IFS: http://www.imf.org
Current Account Balance (Millions of USD) IFS: http://www.imf.org
Foreign Reserve Growth Rate (%) IFS: http://www.imf.org
Risk Premium (Junk Spread) (%) FRED: https://fredqa.stlouisfed.org
Capital Control Measures (range: [0,100]) NBER: http://www.nber.org/data/international-finance/
18The 32 countries we use in this study are based on data availability. These countries are Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Japan,Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UK.
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The variables used in this paper are constructed as described below.
Net Debt Issuance: We remove the seasonality in the international debt security
amount outstanding, which are issued by non-financial corporates and categorized based
on nationality of issuers. Then first difference these series to get net debt issuance in
millions of US dollars for each country.
Exchange Rate:measured in direct quote, i.e. in domestic currency per unit of US
dollar. We take the average of the daily closing rate in the quarter to serve as quarterly
average exchange rate.
Exchange Rate Standard Deviation: The standard deviation of exchange rate within
the quarter based on the daily closing rate.
Exchange Rate Volatility: = (ExchangeRateStandardDeviation/ExchangeRate) ∗
100. It can be interpreted as percentage deviation from the quarterly average. This
measure of exchange rate volatility gets rid of unit of measures, therefore is comparable
across currencies.
Real GDP Growth Rate: We take log difference of seasonality-adjusted real GDP to
get the quarterly GDP growth rate.
Current Account Balance: We remove seasonality in current account balance data
and convert series to be measured in millions of US dollars.
Foreign Reserve Growth Rate: We take log difference of official reserve assets which
are measured in US dollars.
Risk Premium: We use BAA corporate bond rate minus 10-year Treasury bond rate
to measure risk premium in corporate bonds.
Capital Control Measures: We use international capital control indexes on the money
market/ bond market/ equity market/ real estate market/ foreign direct investment sep-
arately. These measures are continuous variables ranging from 0 to 100. This variable is
only available between 1995 and 2013.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Net Debt Issuance (Millions of USD) 358.199 2077.493 -22934.971 23020.229 2720
Exchange Rate 356.624 1599.789 0.014 10000 2738
Exchange Rate Standard Deviation 2.82 35.909 0 1151.724 2738
Exchange Rate Volatility 1.7 1.956 0 48.979 2738
Real GDP Growth 0.88 1.816 -12.074 42.294 2637
Current Account Balance (Millions of USD) 2127.202 11555.506 -39157.066 108339.003 2603
Foreign Reserve Growth 2.743 10.293 -95.652 85.048 2815
BAA minus 10 Treasury Bond Yield 2.406 0.794 1.37 5.58 2855
Capital Control: Money Market 38.035 38.612 0 100 2432
Capital Control: Bond Market 36.397 39.083 0 100 2176
Capital Control: Real Estate Market 47.862 36.247 0 100 2432
Capital Control: Direct Investment 41.612 40.304 0 100 2432
Capital Control: Equity Market 37.87 39.116 0 100 2432
3.5 Results and Interpretation
3.5.1 Price Arbitrage Hypothesis VS. Risk Management Hypoth-
esis
Price arbitrage hypothesis implies that domestic currency depreciation and volatile
exchange rate against US dollar has a negative impact on corporate overseas net debt
issuance. Whereas, risk management hypothesis suggests that domestic currency depre-
ciation will stimulate export and create larger currency exposure position needed to be
hedged by issuing overseas liabilities, and the more volatile the exchange rate against
US dollar, the stronger the incentive for corporates to hedge the exposures. These ideas
implies a positive impact on overseas debt issuance from domestic currency depreciation
and exchange rate fluctuation, from the risk management perspective.
Table 4 reports the results from the first model that tests price arbitrage against risk
management hypothesis. In all specifications, as the exchange rate increases, i.e. domes-
tic currency depreciates, corporate overseas debt issuance will decrease; as exchange rate
becomes more volatile, the less the corporate will issue debt securities overseas. This
result is in line with price arbitrage hypothesis. The corporates issue debt overseas in
expecting that domestic currency will appreciate against US dollar. From model spec-
ifications (1) to (4), we add real GDP growth and current account balance to control
for the economic fundamentals. Interestingly, current account balance is insignificant
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in explaining corporate overseas debt issuance, which confirms the result that corporate
overseas debt issuance does not strongly associate with hedging foreign currency receiv-
able exposure. In the last column, by adding the growth rate of official reserve, a proxy
for government foreign exchange market intervention, we find that government interven-
tion stabilizes corporate debt issuance by mitigating the effect of exchange rate volatility,
while the exchange rate variables still play a significant role in explaining the corporate
overseas debt issuance behavior.
Table 5 reports the same regressions using advanced economy subsample. No signifi-
cant impacts are found for exchange rate and exchange rate volatility, which suggests that
corporates in advanced economies are not sensitive to exchange rate variables in overseas
bond issuance activities. Together with insignificant effect from current account balance,
we could not support either of the hypothesis in advanced economies. Our conjecture is
that corporates in advanced economies could issue bonds overseas in domestic currency so
that these firms are less sensitive to exchange rate variables. Another interpretation could
be, if countries fall into more flexible exchange rate regimes, there is less opportunity to
conduct price arbitrage in the foreign exchange markets. Most emerging markets impose
much stronger capital control at the border to stabilize the exchange rate and maintain
monetary policy independence. Thereupon, the exchange rates in emerging markets may
not reflect market expectation about the ’true’ exchange rate against US dollar. It will
take much longer time to arbitrage away these zero-risk opportunities because capitals
need to find a way to walk around the capital control regulation at the border. Whereas,
in advanced economies, domestic financial markets are well integrated into international
financial markets and the overall capital control levels are much lower at the border for
these counties. Corporates headquartered in advanced economies presumably on aver-
age face a smaller interest rate gap at the border, due to financial market integration.
Moreover, they do not have comparative advantage, compared to financial corporates, to
rise as financial intermediaries because of less regulation at the border. Overall, there
is no evidence to support the price arbitrage hypothesis for the corporates in advanced
economies.
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To summarize, the results from the first model support the conjecture that price
arbitrage incentive dominates corporates overseas debt issuance behavior in emerging
markets. This assessment is in line with the micro evidence from Black and Munro (2010),
which concludes that price arbitrage is the most important incentive for corporates to
issue bonds overseas, although the evidence for financial corporates is even more prevalent.
On the other hand, there is no such evidence found among the counterparts in advanced
economies. Shin and Zhao (2013) suggests that corporates in advanced economies behave
more like textbook-version corporates.
3.5.2 The Effectiveness of Capital Control in Emerging Markets
Typically we would expect a reduction in cross-border activities from all market par-
ticipants when facing a strengthened international regulation. This intuition implies a
negative impact of capital control on corporate debt issuance overseas. Table 6 reports
the effect of capital control on corporate debt issuance in emerging markets. Surprisingly,
we find that capital control on bond market are positively correlated with corporate over-
seas debt issuance. This result suggests that corporates may exercise their comparative
advantage as surrogate financial intermediaries, while financial sectors face strict regu-
lation at the border. This result, together with Caballero et al (2015), illustrates the
importance of corporate overseas debt issuance as surrogate financial service in countries
where strict international capital flow regulation is in place.
Using advanced economy data in the same specifications (Table 7), we see the oppo-
site pattern: capital controls in financial markets are negatively correlated with corporate
overseas debt issuance. This difference in response to capital control across border reflects
that corporates in emerging markets have strong incentive to walk around capital control
to tap into international bond market, whereas corporates in advanced economies typi-
cally follow the regulation to reduce cross-border financial activities. Especially among
our sample countries, many advanced economies have international financial centers in
their home countries or they are by themselves financial centers (e.g. Hong Kong and
Singapore). Corporates in these countries do not have strong incentive to issue bonds
46
overseas, when they face more strict capital control at the border.
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3.5.3 Advanced Economy Monetary Policy Transmission and an
Indirect Test Based on Risk Premium
There exists a common sense that compression in corporate risk premium originates
from expansionary monetary policy in advanced economies, among researchers and mar-
ket participants. To test monetary policy spillover effect, one of the key factors in the
spillover chain is the response of corporate overseas debt issuance from compression in
risk premium. In the third model, we test this broad hypothesis by providing some sup-
portive evidence from the impact of risk premium on corporate overseas debt issuance
behavior. Table 8 provides strong evidence to support that corporates issue more bonds
overseas in response to compression in risk premium in emerging market economies.
No significant effect in advance economies (Table 9) suggests that corporates in these
countries do have different incentive in conducting cross-border activities, compared to
the emerging market counterparts. In advanced economies, domestic financial markets
are well connected in the international financial market. Compression in risk premium
in international bond market also imply compression in risk premium in domestic bond
market. Therefore, these firms have no strong incentive to go abroad to issue bonds,
whereas the corporates in emerging markets face a segregation between domestic bond
market and international bond market.
These results offer some support to the idea of advance economy monetary policy
spillover effect. Although the less integration of emerging markets in international finan-
cial system, monetary policy in advanced economies do push international investors to
crack through border barriers to chase for yield; and meanwhile market participants in
emerging markets also try to walk around the regulation to arbitrage the return across
the borders. This phenomenon raises the concern about the relevant liquidity measures
for policy makers, even for those policy makers in countries where impose tight capital
regulation at the borders. They may also need to put an eye on the global liquidity
measure, as it helps explain anomalies in domestic liquidity supply. (Chung et al, 2014)
In the most complete regression estimation, we include all the three sets of variables
together with real economic fundamentals. The effect of exchange rate variables disap-
50
pears. This result may imply that the effect of capital control can dominate the effect
of exchange rate variables because they are strongly interdependent and it is hard to
tease apart the marginal effect if we try to regress them simultaneously in one estima-
tion. Without controlling for capital control policies, we found the consistent results as
in previous model specifications.
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3.6 Robustness Check
So far, our main results show that the compression in risk premium increases corporate
overseas debt issuance and the stronger regulation policy makers impose at the border,
the more bonds corporates issue overseas. These features seem to suggest the role of cor-
porates as surrogate financial intermediaries. If this interpretation is solid, by adding the
interaction between risk premium and capital control measures, we should see the effect
of this interaction term is negative in the second phase of global liquidity. The reason is
as follows. If corporates are indeed surrogate financial intermediaries, they have stronger
incentive to issue overseas when both risk premium is lower and financial corporates face
more strict capital control at the borders. Given a constant level of capital control, the
lower the corporate risk premium is, the more corporate bond issuance. Given a constant
level of risk premium, the tighter the capital control is, the less corporate bond issuance.
This is because, corporate capital cost from issuing bonds is the risk free interest rate
plus corporate risk premium. A constant level of risk premium implies a constant level
of capital cost in the bold part. Given a constant level of capital cost, the corporates
should have less incentive to serve as surrogate financial intermediaries when facing more
strict capital regulation at the borders. Therefore, the effect of the interaction term in
the second phase of global liquidity is expected to be negative if corporates indeed serve
as surrogate financial intermediaries.
We provide the robustness test results in Table 10 below. To tease apart the effect of
capital control and risk premium, we incorporate them separately in different regressions
and also split the whole sample based on the timing of the second phase of global liq-
uidity. The first two columns report the effect of capital control on corporate overseas
debt issuance. The effect of capital control in the 2007-2013 subsample is positive and
three times as much as the counterpart in the 1993-2006 subsample, suggesting that
strengthened international capital control policies indeed stimulate corporates to act as
financial intermediaries across borders. The middle two columns report the effect of risk
premium on corporate overseas debt issuance. Corporates were not sensitive to corporate
risk premium before 2007. However, since 2007, one percentage decrease in corporate risk
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premium lead to more than 100 million US dollar more corporate bond issuance within
the following quarter. The last two columns provide further evidence to support the cor-
porate role as surrogate financial intermediaries in the second phase of global liquidity.
The effect of interaction term between capital control and risk premium is insignificant
before 2007, while in the second phase of global liquidity, the coefficient of the interaction
is negative and significant. Based on the intuition described in the last paragraph, the
data favor the conjecture about corporates behaving like financial intermediaries. It is
worth to point out, in the last two regressions, we control for linear time trend instead
of time fixed effect because our capital control measures are in annual frequency. There
will not exist meaningful variation in the interaction term if we control for annual time
fixed effect. Therefore, we instead use annual time trend to control for the variation over
time.
To sum up, we perform a robustness check to verify our interpretation about corpo-
rates serving as financial intermediaries, with further evidence by exploiting information
in subsamples and allowing for the interaction between variables.
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3.7 Conclusions and Policy Implication
This paper studies the determinants of corporate overseas debt issuance in 32 countries
during the period 1993-2015. The results provide some macro evidence to support the
conjecture that corporates in emerging markets serve as financial intermediaries at the
border to facilitate global liquidity transmission. Corporates hold a carry trade position,
in other words, borrowing liabilities in foreign currency and holding assets in domestic
currency, during the periods when domestic currency is expected to appreciate against US
dollar and the exchange rate is less volatile. The rise in corporate overseas debt issuance
can be explained as the product of advanced economy monetary policy spillover and
capital control policies at the border. As corporate risk premium compresses, corporates
have incentive to serve as surrogate financial intermediaries across border, especially in
countries where domestic financial sector faces strict international capital flow regulation.
Policy makers should carefully evaluate the potential side effect from international cap-
ital control policies. Ill-designed these policies reduces the effectiveness of cross-border
capital control. Furthermore, these policies may create the systematic risk outside the
traditional framework and makes it harder for policy makers to monitor and manage
international capital flow activities. Additionally, policy makers should be aware the in-
ternational financial risk transmission through either monetary policy shocks in advanced
economies or financial risk materialization in emerging market corporates. The last but
not the least, domestic currency depreciation and volatile exchange rate against US dol-
lar may add uncertainty in the capacity for emerging markets corporates to borrow and
rollover the existing debt.
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Chapter 4
What is Driving Debt Dollarization in
Global Economy? A Dynamic Factor
Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The takeoff of US dollar-denominated debt issuance 19 has been one of the most
eye-catching phenomena in the global financial market since the Great Recession. Many
studies suggest that loose US monetary policy may factor in the global liquidity transmis-
sion during this period. (Chung et al., 2015) While Basel III tightened the cross-border
capital flow regulation, the border-control policy loopholes push international capital
flow towards the global bond market from the global banking system. In short, the rapid
growth of dollar debt seems to be closely related to the super-low policy rates and quan-
titative easing policies from the Fed. Nevertheless, it is possible that some other factors,
such as, the fast economic growth of emerging market economies, European Sovereign
Debt Crisis and some country-specific factors, could play a critical role in explaining the
second phase of global liquidity. (Shin, 2014)
In this paper, we want to understand the relative role of these factors in explaining
the dollar-denominated debt growth in the global bond market. This research question
becomes more important nowadays in the sense that market participants and policy mak-
ers are more aware of international liquidity transmission as a potential threat to global
19This phenomenon is often termed as debt dollarization, referring to the international borrowers
issuing dollar debt in global bond market.
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financial stability. The conventional wisdom in the literature suggests that domestic
business cycle and monetary policy determine the liquidity condition within one country.
This was mainly due to lack of global financial market integration. Domestic condition
was more relevant for policy makers at that time to implement policies to offset economic
fluctuation. With global trade and financial integration, the impact of the external shocks
on domestic market has been increasing over time. It is important for market participants
and policy makers to watch the external economic environment, especially the most in-
fluential player in global financial market - Federal Reserve System of United States (the
Fed). 20 Taper Tantrum in 2013 is a good example of the Fed’s monetary policy influence
on foreign exchange rates and asset prices. Meanwhile, regional economic integration, for
instance, the European Monetary Union (EMU), also have an impact on foreign currency
loans and deposit in domestic banking system. (Kishor and Neanidis, 2015)
This paper decomposes the movements in dollar debt in a set of 12 countries into
global, emerging market and idiosyncratic factors using a dynamic factor model. This
approach helps us in examining the relative importance of different factors in evolution
of dollar debt growth in these countries. This also helps us in examining the hypothesis
of loose US monetary policy as the primary source of the boom in dollar debt growth.
We find that the global factor accounts for most of the variations of the dollar debt
growth in these countries. The emerging market factor also plays a secondary role in ex-
plaining the rapid growth of the outstanding dollar debt balance among emerging market
economies. The country-idiosyncratic factor, however, is not as important compared to
these external factors. The results suggest that the global financial market integration
plays an important role in the cross-border liquidity transmission. From the time series
of three decomposed factors, we find that the global factor has been accelerating since
2009. This pattern coincides with the extremely loose monetary policy environment in
the US after Great Recession. This result further enhances the message to the policy
makers that major country monetary policy spillover effect can have a significant impact
on the cross-border capital flow of other countries. We also find that financial market
20The Managing Director Christine Lagarde of International Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned Chair-
woman Janet Yellen many times to take into account the global effect of US monetary policy.
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uncertainty, VIX, is highly negatively correlated with the level of global factor implying
global increase in the level of debt dollarization in case of a decline in financial market
uncertainty.
The rest of the paper are structured as follows. The second section provides a liter-
ature review about global liquidity transmission and discusses the associated monetary
policy spillover effect. The third section introduces the data used in this study and the
setup of the dynamic factor model. The fourth section interprets and presents the results
from the model. The last section concludes the paper.
4.2 Literature Review
The recent surge in non-financial corporate (hereafter ”corporate” ) overseas debt is-
suance after 2007-2009 financial crisis has started drawing attention from macroeconomic
researchers, as it plays a critical role in the conduct of international capital flow activities
in the emerging markets. This surge in the overseas debt issuance is also referred to as the
second phase of global liquidity (Shin, 2013).The first phase (2003-2007) of global liquidity
is associated with a rapid increase in cross-border international bank loans. The inter-
national banks lose the market share to international bond markets in the cross-border
activities substantially after the global financial crisis, partly because of the strengthened
financial system regulation. This fall in cross-border lending by international banks was
followed by a rise in the overseas debt issuance of the non-financial corporate sector. The
relative importance of corporate overseas debt issuance can be gauged from the fact that
more than half of the net ”external” financing of emerging economies in 2012 took place
through the issuance of international debt securities (Turner, 2014).
We borrow Figure 9 from Shin and Zhao (2013) to visualize the role of corporate debt
issuance in global liquidity transmission. In the first phase of global liquidity, domes-
tic household depositors and international investors (mostly international banks) supply
liquidity to domestic financial system to finance the final corporate borrower production
projects. However, in the second phase of global liquidity, domestic large corporates,
rise to serve as surrogate intermediaries to facilitate liquidity transmission into domestic
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financial system, presumably due to the restriction on direct lending from international
banks. The large corporates headquartered in emerging markets may use their overseas
subsidiaries to issue bonds in international financial markets and receive the proceeds
through intra-company transactions (The subsidiaries can pay for operation costs for the
headquarters, for instance). In this way, the proceeds owing into emerging markets are
treated as a form of foreign direct investment and do not appear in the residency-based
external debt positions. This conjecture worries policy makers about the effectiveness of
capital control policies at the border and the creation of systematic risks outside tradi-
tional international financial regulation framework.
Figure 9: Transmission of Global Liquidity across Borders
Dynamic factor model has been widely used in the literature to study the relative
contribution of global, regional and country-idiosyncratic factors on international finance
issues. Kishor and Ssozi (2001) use a dynamic factor model to measure business cycle
synchronization as the proportion of structural shocks that are common across East
African Community (EAC) countries. Kishor and Neanidis (2013) use a dynamic factor
model to decompose fluctuations in financial dollarization for 24 transition economies into
a common factor, an EU factor, a non-EU factor, and country-idiosyncratic factors to
study the relative importance of the EU factor to the financial dollarization of a country.
Bhatt et. al. (2017) decomposes the observed variation in long-term sovereign bond
yields for each of 21 OECD countries into a common factor, a regional factor (EMU/non-
EMU) and an idiosyncratic country specific factor to study the impact of EMU on bond
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yield convergence, using a time-varying dynamic factor model. These papers use dynamic
factor model to study the relative importance of various levels of co-movements across
countries. Therefore, we believe it is appropriate to use a dynamic factor model to answer
the question about the relative strength of the global, regional and idiosyncratic factors
on the dollar debt growth rates across 12 countries.
4.3 Data and Empirical Model
4.3.1 Data Description
We download the country-level time series data of the outstanding dollar-denominated
debt securities from Bank of International Settlement (BIS) debt security statistics. The
ultimate borrowers of these securities are non-financial corporations. The outstanding
amount of dollar debt is aggregated based upon the nationality instead of the residency
of the issuers. We take the log difference of the outstanding amount to compute the
growth rate of the dollar debt growth for each country. In this study, we pick top 12
countries with the largest dollar debt amount outstanding at the forth quarter of 2016.
There are 6 developed economies: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom
and United States, and 6 emerging market economies: Brazil, China, Hong Kong India,
Indonesia and Mexico. These data series start from the forth quarter of 1993 and end at
the last quarter of 2016, in total 93 quarters.
The summary statistics of the dollar debt growth rates in these countries is in Table
11. For the developed economies, the average dollar debt growth rates are around 2 to 3
percents; while for the emerging market economies, the average dollar debt growth rates
are around 5 percents during the sample period. Not surprisingly, the standard deviation
of the debt growth rates in emerging market economies are on average higher than the
developed counterparts. This distinction between the developed economy and emerg-
ing markets suggests that there may be common movements specific to the developed
economies and the emerging market economies respectively. Therefore, in the model be-
low, we propose to model this feature by adding a developed market factor to capture the
co-movements among Australia, Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom and United
62
States. Similarly, an emerging market factor is added in modeling the dynamics of Brazil,
China, Hong Kong India, Indonesia and Mexico.
Table 11: Summary Statistics: The Dollar Debt Growth in 12 Countries
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Australia 93 2.931 7.859 −7.309 55.701
Canada 93 2.225 2.763 −4.319 10.330
France 93 2.932 9.456 −35.292 60.661
Germany 93 3.599 13.356 −23.209 80.950
UK 93 3.211 4.685 −6.336 22.306
US 93 2.956 6.086 −12.723 22.765
Brazil 93 4.073 6.829 −7.566 33.001
China 93 7.478 10.861 −7.966 64.189
HongKong 93 4.925 15.376 −7.710 132.599
India 93 5.882 19.621 −29.570 119.760
Indonesia 93 5.175 10.770 −16.461 51.456
Mexico 93 2.929 7.332 −19.100 28.162
4.3.2 Empirical Model
Our objective is to measure the relative impact of the global/ regional/idiosyncratic
factors on the dollar debt growth. For this purpose, we construct a model where we
decompose the dollar debt growth into four factors: (i) a global factor, (ii) a developed
market factor, (iii) an emerging market factor and (iv) an individual country factor. The
global factor is common across all the 12 countries in the system, regardless of whether
the country is a developed country or an emerging market country. The developed market
factor is common across countries including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, United
Kingdom and United States, whereas the emerging market factor is common across Brazil,
China, Hong Kong India, Indonesia and Mexico. The portion of dollar debt growth that
can not be explained by the unobservable (global, developed economy, emerging market)
factors is the idiosyncratic factor that is unique to each country. All dynamic relationships
in the model are captured by modeling each of the factors as autoregressive processes.
Suppose yit ( yjt) stands for the growth rate of dollar debt for country i (j) at time
period t. We can decompose this variable into four components. The global factor (Ct) is
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the common factor that estimates the impact of macroeconomic conditions in all countries
on the dollar debt growth of country i at time t. For example, if there is a common
shock that would accelerate the dollar debt growth, it would be captured by an increase
in Ct. Similarly, Dt denotes the developed market factor that captures the common
movement across the six developed economies, whereas Et denotes the emerging market
factor that captures the common movement across the six emerging market economies.
The inclusion of the regional factors absorbs the common movement within each country
type, to control for potentially higher volatility not being due to an idiosyncratic country
component. Coefficients γi, δi, γj, δj are the factor loadings on the common factor of the
developed country i, the developed market factor of the developed country i, the common
factor of the emerging country j, the emerging market factor of the emerging country j.
These factor loadings reflect the degree to which the variations in the dollar debt growth
can be explained by each of the factors. Finally, ηit (ηjt) is an idiosyncratic component,
which is unique to each country. This idiosyncratic component reflects the fluctuations
in the dollar debt growth that can be explained by the individual country characteristics.
Developed Economies
yit = γiCt + δiDt + ηit (13)
i = Australia, Canada, France,Germany, UnitedKingdom,UnitedStates (14)
Emerging Markets
yjt = γjCt + δjEt + ηjt (15)
j = Brazil, China,HongKong, India, Indonesia,Mexico (16)
Because the three factors and the idiosyncratic component are unobserved, we need to
specify a dynamic structure for their identification. To this end, we follow the dynamic
factor model of Stock and Watson (1991) and assume an AR (1) process for all four
components. They are specified as below, where the innovation terms in equations (5)
-(8), εt, υt, νt, and ekt, are mutually orthogonal across all equations and countries in the
system.
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Common Factors
Ct = β1Ct−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, 1) (17)
Dt = β2Dt−1 + υt, υt ∼ N(0, 1) (18)
Et = β3Et−1 + νt, νt ∼ N(0, 1) (19)
Idiosyncratic Factors
ηkt = δkηkt−1 + ekt, ekt ∼ N(0, σ2k) (20)
k = i, j (21)
Further, we measure the relative contributions of each of the four factors to the dollar
debt growth in each country with variance decomposition analysis. This provides an
empirical assessment of how much of a country’s fluctuations in the dollar debt growth
are attributable to each of the three common factors and to the idiosyncratic component.
Because the global factor, the developed market factor, the emerging market factor, and
country-specific factors are by construction orthogonal to each other, it is possible to
perform variance decomposition for these components in the dynamics of dollar debt
growth based on equation (1) or (3), which can be rewritten as
var(yit) = var(γiCt) + var(δiDt) + var(ηit) (22)
var(yjt) = var(γjCt) + var(δjEt) + var(ηjt) (23)
or as
var(yit) = γ
2
i σ
2
ε/(1− β21) + δ2i σ2υ/(1− β22) + σ2ηi/(1− δ2i ) (24)
var(yjt) = γ
2
jσ
2
ε/(1− β21) + δ2jσ2ν/(1− β23) + σ2ηj/(1− δ2j ) (25)
The last term in equation (12) and (13) represents the variance of the dollar debt
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growth associated with country-specific factors. The fraction of volatility due to the
global factor would be
γ2kσ
2
ε/(1− β21)/var(ykt) (26)
which suggests that the share of each factor depends on its relative variance as well
as the relative persistence of its autoregressive parameter.
To disentangle the importance of the various factors, we can cast the dynamic factor
model given by equations (1), (3), (5)-(8) into a state-space framework. Following the
literature, we assume zero covariance across shocks to the global factor, the developed
economy factor, the emerging market factor, and the idiosyncratic factors. The preceding
state-space model is estimated using maximum likelihood via the Kalman filter. Due to
the fact that the scales of those unobserved factors cannot be uniquely identified, we
assume a unit innovation variance for all factors.
In sum, the dynamic factor model we use is well suited for studying the properties of
the fluctuations in dollar debt growth. This technique allows estimation of the evolution
of each factor over time. In this way, we can identify changes or breaks in the relation-
ship between the factors and dollar debt growth during the examined period of time.
Importantly, such regime shifts can be traced back to changes in policies and, thus, offer
intuitive interpretations and policy recommendations.
Measurement Equation:
yit
yjt
 =
γi δi 0 1 0
γj 0 φj 0 1


Ct
Dt
Et
ηit
ηjt

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Transition Equation:

Ct
Dt
Et
ηit
ηjt

=

β1 0 0 0 0
0 β2 0 0 0
0 0 β3 0 0
0 0 0 δi 0
0 0 0 0 δj


Ct−1
Dt−1
Et−1
ηit−1
ηjt−1

+

εt
υt
νt
eit
ejt

Variance-Covariance Matrix of the Shocks to Factors:
Q =

σ2εt 0 0 0 0
0 σ2υt 0 0 0
0 0 σ2νt 0 0
0 0 0 σ2eit 0
0 0 0 0 σ2ejt

4.4 Results and Interpretation
In this section, we examine the evolution of the various factors and analyze their
ability to track changes in the outstanding dollar debt in our sample. We then examine
the sources of fluctuations across factors, using variance decomposition.
4.4.1 Evolution of the Global, Developed, and Emerging Market Factors
Figure 10 displays the dynamics in the outstanding dollar debt that is associated with
the global factor, the developed market factor and the emerging market factor. It is very
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clear that the global factor has been increasing dramatically since 2009. Compared to
the global factor ,the changes in the regional factors are subtle. This is to say, the global
factor plays a dominant role in explaining the rapid growth of dollar debt during the post
Great Recession period.
Figure 10: Dollar Debt: Dynamic Factor Decomposition in 12 Countries
What is the underlying global factor that drives the skyrocketing outstanding dollar
debt since 2009? The Fed almost immediately lowered the federal funds rate towards zero
after the 2009 financial crisis outbreak. Quantitative easing programs further dampen
the shadow federal funds rate to the negative territory (Wu and Xia, 2016). The ultra-
low interest rate environment motivates American investors to seek for higher yields
outside the US. Prior to 2009, global banking system closed the cross-border interest rate
arbitrage opportunity by operating the commercial bank business at the international
scope, i.e., taking deposit from low interest rate environment and giving loans to the
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borrowers that were facing higher domestic interest rates. Since 2009, the changes to
Basel III capital framework have accentuated the cross-border regulation on the global
banks, with adverse impacts on cross-border capital flows into emerging markets through
international bank loans. At the same time, the global bond market started taking the
market share of the cross-border capital flow from global banking system, due to the
comparative advantage gained through the capital control policy loopholes. In sum,
the joint force of low interest rate environment and ill-designed cross-border banking
regulation might explain the boom of global bond market during the post crisis period.
Figure 11: Dollar Debt: Dynamic Factor Decomposition in 12 Countries
Figure 11 takes a closer look at the evolutions of the developed market factor and
the emerging market factor. Although the changes in the emerging market factor are
not as sizable, we still observe a similar pattern as from the global factor. The emerging
market factor reached the local maximum prior to 2009 financial crisis. While there was
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a downturn afterwards, the dip only lasts one year followed by a take-off. Since then, the
emerging market factor appear to skyrocket throughout the rest of the sample period.
The developed market factor almost stays flat around zero throughout the whole sample
period.
What explains the difference between the emerging market factor and the developed
market factor? What is unique among the emerging markets? There are probably two
reasons. The first one is the economic growth among emerging market economies. Prior
to the crisis, there was a boom phase of global economy. The increase of dollar debt in
emerging market economy during this period captured the boom phase of credit cycle.
Since 2009, the financial crisis hit most of the developed economies, whereas the emerging
markets provide an opportunity for safety and return. The fast economic growth among
emerging markets encourage the borrowers to take advantage of global low interest rate
environment. Moreover, as the overall interested rates among the emerging markets are
higher than the counterpart among the developed economies, the borrowers from the
emerging markets have stronger incentive to issue dollar debt in the global bond market.
The second reason is the developed market is more integrated into the global financial
market; therefore the global factor probably captures the majority of the variations among
the developed countries.
4.4.2 Sources of Dollar Debt Fluctuations
We now examine the sources of fluctuations in dollar debt using variance decomposi-
tion. As a measure of the importance of the factors for the dollar debt growth, we present
the variance shares attributable to each factor: the global factor, the developed market
factor, the emerging market factor and the country-idiosyncratic factors.
Table 12 shows the results for this variance decomposition for the dollar debt growth
rates among 12 countries during 1993-2016. In most of the countries, the global factor
explains the majority of the variations of the dollar debt growth of the country. The
regional factors, whether the developed market factor or the emerging market factor,
plays the secondary role in explaining these variations. The country-idiosyncratic factors
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account for only single-digit percentages of the variations of the dollar debt growth among
most of the sample countries.
Table 12 clearly reflects the dominant impact of the global factor and the minor in-
fluence from the country-idiosyncratic factors. This result suggests that it is the global
factor that drives the cross-border debt issuance behavior. The global low interest rate
environment creates the surge of the dollar debt around the world. This is to say, some-
times the Fed’s monetary policy can be more important to explain a country liquidity
condition than the country domestic economic events per se. These results shed light
on the global financial stability issues. On one hand, the US monetary policy, with the
traditional objective of dual mandate, could be the source of uncertainty to stabilize the
global capital flow. If the domestic price and employment requires the Fed to behave in
a different way than that being expected from the global financial stability perspective,
then the US monetary policy might create turbulences to global economy. On the other
hand, policy makers around the world have to watch the external factors closely and main-
tain enough foreign reserves to manage international financial risk in this interconnected
global economy.
There are three countries in the sample that the global factor does not play a dominant
role in explaining the dollar debt growth of that country. For Germany, 48.50 percents
of the the variations attribute to the global factor and 48.97 percents attribute to the
developed market factor. This result might be due to the critical role of Germany within
European Monetary Union. Brazil and India have less than 50 percents of variations that
can be explained by the global factor, whereas the emerging market factor becomes the
primary source of variations for these two countries. Compared to China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia and Mexico, Brazil and India are less integrated in the global financial market.
The variations of the dollar debt growth are more related to the emerging market co-
movements. This result suggests that the external shocks from other emerging market
economies may have a significant impact on Brazil and India. Policy makers in these two
countries should pay attention to not only the US monetary policy shocks but also the
macroeconomic conditions among the emerging market economies.
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Table 12: Factor Variance Decomposition: Dollar Debt Growth (1993-2016)
Country Global Developed Emerging Idiosyncratic
Australia 67.89% 26.14% 5.96%
Canada 78.89% 8.38% 12.73%
France 94.50% 0.11% 5.39%
Germany 48.50% 48.97% 2.53%
UK 65.42% 29.60% 4.98%
US 88.55% 4.57% 6.88%
Brazil 36.79% 61.19% 2.02%
China 82.97% 15.71% 1.32%
Hong Kong 75.64% 18.54% 5.82%
India 14.21% 84.88% 0.91%
Indonesia 60.46% 34.19% 5.35%
Mexico 85.01% 7.66% 7.34%
4.4.3 What is behind the global factor?
So far, from the dynamic factor model, we have found that it is the global factor
that accounts for most of the variations in the dollar debt growth among these countries.
Furthermore, since 2009, the global factor increases sharply. Combining these empirical
results, we believe that the global factor helps explain the rapid growth of dollar debt
during the post recession period.
Nevertheless, we still have not dived into the question what is the global factor. In
the literature, the global factor that drives cross-border spillovers in financial conditions
and credit growth is often termed as ”Global Liquidity”. The term is often used in con-
nection with monetary policy spillovers from advanced economies. (Shin, 2013) A few
papers suggest that, due to low US monetary policy rate, US dollar weakens against
other currencies and also the term premium decreases in the post-recession period, which
is featured with the expectation of low near term volatility, which can be measured by
VIX (CBOE Volatility Index). We build a correlation matrix to see the co-movements
between the global factor and key macro variables from the literature. (Table 13) We find
that, during 1994-2016, the global factor is moderately negatively correlated with shadow
federal funds rate, suggesting that federal funds rate is a decent indicator of global liquid-
ity transmission. The US monetary policy rate could be the underlying global driver of
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liquidity transmission. Further research can be done to disentangle the macroeconomic
fundamentals behind the global factor.
Table 13: Correlation Matrix
Sample Period: 1994:Q4 - 2016:Q4
Measure 1 2 3 4 5
1. Global Factor 1.00 -0.28 0.17 0.10 -0.55
2. VIX -0.28 1.00 0.24 -0.08 -0.01
3. Dollar Index 0.17 0.24 1.00 0.03 0.10
4. Term Premium 0.10 -0.08 0.03 1.00 -0.24
5. Shadow Rate -0.55 -0.01 0.10 -0.24 1.00
4.5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the debt dollarization in global financial market. The amount
of the outstanding dollar-denominated debt securities has been increasing over time,
particularly during the post Great Recession period when the Fed implemented a series
of unconventional monetary policies to combat the economic downturn. Using a dynamic
factor model, we decompose the fluctuations in the dollar debt growth of 12 countries
into a global factor, a developed market factor, an emerging market factor, and country-
specific factors. We find that, it is the global factor that plays the dominant role in the
dollar debt growth of these countries. Furthermore, since 2009, the global factor of the
dollar debt growth has been increasing dramatically, suggesting that the global liquidity
transmission is closely related to the US monetary policy spillover effect. Regarding to the
policy implication of this paper, we think the US monetary policy, with the traditional
objective of dual mandate, could be the source of uncertainty to stabilize the global
capital flow in the interconnected global financial market. Policy makers around the
world have to watch the external factors closely and maintain enough foreign reserves to
actively manage international financial risk.
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